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I am honored that Professor Yang has lavished such attention on my decades-old
argument and I am pleased to respond. I’ve changed. Decades ago when the
argument was fresh, I resisted answering critics who misconstrued my argument.
Instead, I had a series of long conversations with them, including but not limited to
those to whom Professor Yang appeals. I remember the conversations fondly
because they started many life-long friendships—particularly with Christoff
Harbsmeier, BAO Zhi Ming, Henry Rosemont, Roger Ames, and Angus Graham.
All the conversations are rich in my memory but the pivotal one for my current
change in strategy was with Christoff (inevitably, over a beer—a tradition we both
cherish and repeat at every opportunity). Christoff and I met after he generously
invited me to discuss drafts of his article criticizing my “mass noun hypothesis.” I
pointed out that he had formulated and criticized a Whorfian version of what was a
Quinian (and Wittgensteinian) argument. Although I thought his attack on Whorf
weak, I ignored the issue since, for me, he was attacking a straw man, i.e., his own
mass noun hypothesis. He responded that if he had misstated my argument, I should
respond to him in detail in print otherwise his presentation of my argument “would
stand.” I argued that responding would simply consist of my repeating myself; that
philosophers and other academics could (and would) read his article and my book
for themselves and would see how the two were different. After multiple beers and
lengthy vigorous discussion we parted friends agreeing to disagree.
In my youth, I cherished more faith in the objectivity of philosophy and the power of
reason. Age has made me realistic about the politics of academic discourse. Christoff
and I reprised the moment in Amsterdam last November (over beer, of course) and I
admitted to Christoff that he had won the bet. Almost all published comments since his
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have credited me, as Professor Yang does here, with Christoff’s Whorfian version of the
“mass noun hypothesis” rather than my own. Chastened now by the operation of
quorum sensing in academia, I have begun to publish my objections to this distortion
of my argument. In the meantime, I have come to understand better the theory of
meaning and how radical translation works, so while the argument structure is the
same, my ability to explain it has changed so I won’t merely be repeating it.
My argument started from Quine’s skepticism about meaning and his radical
translation argument for dealing with that skepticism. Let us call mine the Mass-
Quine and Christoff’s the Mass-Whorf hypothesis—Professor Yang’s formulation of
it is typical. The central difference is that the mass-Whorf, empirical linguist takes
meaning facts as data to be explained causally by grammar. Mine was not a
linguistic argument but an argument about the ancient Chinese theories of language
that lay behind the dispute between the Mohists and Gongsun Long about “White
Horse.” I did speculate about a linguistic matter that may have distracted readers. I
noted that Pre-Han grammar was not a mass noun grammar because it directly
modified nouns with numbers. So I called it a hybrid noun structure, and noting that
historical linguists claimed that the regularization of sortal use dates from the Han
reform, I speculated that it may have been motivated by the same background theory
ming 名 (names). My argument, however, was solely about reconstructing that
background theory from the texts using Quine’s Radical Translation argument form.
The goal of the theory was explaining the White Horse dispute, not that speculative
by-product.
Quine was skeptical of meaning. He argued that meaning defied non-circular
analysis and used radical translation to illustrate what empirical verification of
meaning claims would amount to. I wanted to argue there was a correct way to
interpret the phrase and my argument did rely on natural causation. Besides
reversing the argument, the Mass-Whorf hypothesis uses causal necessity/sufficiency
where the Mass-Quine relied on only causal possibility/probability. Quine argued
that radical translation projects lacked any unique solution and concluded that
meaning claims are not empirically verifiable. From this attack on the “two dogmas”
of empiricism, he concluded that there could be no fact of the matter about what a
word or expression means. That was the argument I attempted to answer—focused
on the White-Horse paradox of bai ma fei ma 白馬非馬. I had thought that GONGSUN
Long must somehow be confusing subclass and class membership relations.
Quine’s pivotal claim that inspired my line of reasoning was that time-slices,
instantiations, compositions, and masses and many other interpretations of ordinary
nouns like “rabbit” were empirically compatible with any language in radical
translation. Quine’s gavagai discussion, not the grammar of Chinese, triggered my
consideration of a mass-like solution. The philosophical problem that gripped me
was how to construct an interpretive argument for understanding the White Horse
puzzle that could evade Quine’s meaning skepticism. To understand the role of
causation, one must first feel the grip of Quine’s philosophical puzzle, be skeptical
of the very meaning facts that constitute the empirical linguist’s data.
I wondered how we could prove that baima 白馬 in baima fei ma 白馬非馬 had any
definitive meaning. One of the proposed theories was that it means “white
horseness,” and another “a white horse”—both giving the meaning in English. The
consensus then was it meant both depending on which one made each claim true.
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Chinese words, I learned in Sinology, “have lots of meanings.” Quine argued for an
analysis of claims about inter-linguistic meaning. He proposed radical translation as
an indirect way of verifying these claims. Instead of appealing to the meaning to
justify a translation, Quine suggested, we must reverse the order of justification. If
we can justify a translation as being correct without relying on a meaning premise,
then we can justify a conclusion that they share an inter-linguistic meaning—even
absent an analysis of “meaning.” We refer to the sentences of the object language
and give their meaning indirectly via their “correct” translation into a meta-language
whose meaning we do understand.
We show a translation is correct indirectly by applying a translation manual to
strings of the object language. So our task becomes justifying a choice between
translation manuals. Quine relied on the systematic relation of meaning and belief in
this justification. The rival “translation manuals” play roles analogous to rival
explanatory theories except they interpret rather than causally explain the beliefs.
They semantically assign meanings to strings to yield the beliefs we use to justify the
manuals that generate them from assertions in the texts. The manuals consist of
entries for the lexical items (Chinese characters) and a semantic syntax—a
systematic function from grammatical structures and the lexical items that yields
an English sentence for each possible sentence of the target language.
Quine argued for starting this project using “stimulus meaning” as the empirical
test. In effect, we take an empirical happening in the world of speakers as causing
them to make or assent to an utterance. The correct translation manual then assigns
English expressions of a belief (assertion) that would be similarly stimulated—e.g. a
rabbit’s jerkily dashing across the field. However, Quine noted, the very same
stimulus could generate the belief that there is rabbit-stuff, an instance of rabbit-
hood, or a collection of rabbit-parts before us. All are equally well-grounded in the
empirical situation—hence his indeterminacy of translation. So, far from solving it,
Quine suggested that the problem defied solution. There was no way empirically to
verify that one or the other of the translations was correct, hence no determinate fact
about inter-linguistic meaning.
I was trying to work out how we could narrow the range of preferred translation
manuals for Classical Chinese. One clue was in Quine and originated with Chomsky
(as I had learned from Henry Rosemont)—syntax did matter. The meaning of a
sentence had to be a product of the application of learnable grammatical rules to a
finite and determinate list of lexical items. Native speakers’ competence should
enable them to understand indefinitely many novel sentences by understanding the
concepts + the grammar. The meaning of a sentence should be accessible to them as
a reliable consequence of putting those concepts in that syntactical structure. Only
what that grammar could express with those concepts could be a meaning of a
sentence of Wenyan. Notice that this point is not limited to Chomsky’s natural
languages—the same is true of logic, mathematics and etc. Probably the reader has
never seen the number 580,752,989, but anyone who knows arithmetic conventions
can understand it by understanding 10 digits and the rules for construction using
base 10.
Still, grammar does not have any direct causal relation to the content of concepts.
Causal probability enters the account in a much different role—i.e., as when reasons
are causes. Still, the semantic syntax insight is fundamental and often ignored. To
Remembering Mass: Response to YANG Xiaomei 543
repeat, what a sentence can mean is a function of a learnable grammar and the range
of concepts and their learnable contents. Conceptual contents play the roles that fill
empty slots in the grammar. Baima 白馬, whatever it means, must function as an
ordered pair of lexical items filling the empty slot in the structure “___fei ma 非馬.”
Further, the lexical entry should not consist of a long disjunction (a free choice) of
English translations unless they share a meaning. The native community is able to
compose and derive the meaning of complex sentences from the lexical content, the
grammar and discourse context. They do not walk around with Chinese-English
dictionaries or the inner thoughts of modern interpreters in their heads. This I joked
was the “English is the only real language” fallacy and hence rejected the familiar
list of English equivalents—that ma 馬 can as necessary mean each of “horseness,”
“a horse,” “the species,” “the collection,” etc. A definitive learnable lexical meaning
should combine grammatically in a reliable grammatical way to yield a single
sentence meaning for the community. I argued that “horse-stuff” did this best.
Still I needed an argument for horse-stuff as the single entry in the translation
manual. The crucial thing Quine had noticed was a correlation of meaning and
belief. We can assign anything we want as the meaning entry as long as we were
willing to ascribe the linked beliefs to the community (and vice versa). So Quine’s
method opened up the possibility, exploited first by Davidson, that we select the
translation manual that ascribed true beliefs to the community. That is, when we
have translated all their expressions and assents into English, the English result
should be that which produces a maximally true set.
The beliefs, again, had to be generated by a perfectly general syntax and a finite
cluster of lexical contents (English translations of terms). In Quine’s terms, the result
had to be holistic—we could not achieve it as above. Quine’s indeterminacy lay in
the choice of the single consistent meaning to assign the term not the freedom to
make it what we like on an ad hoc basis. “Horse-stuff” did make GONGSUN Long’s
head sentence false but many others from the Mohist true. That approach makes the
project look too arbitrary, however, counting how many assertions of a particular
school survive to the present. Was it true until scholars learned how to read the
Mohist Canon, and then suddenly became false? The correct meaning should not be
a function of such later historical developments.
Davidson’s interpretive charity had several other theoretical drawbacks. One was
that the holism, while blocking ad hoc meaning variation, did not remove the
indeterminacy. There being a rabbit entails that there being a member of the species,
some rabbit-stuff, a sequence of time-slices of rabbit etc. Furthermore, truth charity
deals with theoretical beliefs in an improbable way. Astronomy now finds evidence
of up to 10,000 super galaxy-clusters—the largest composite “things” making up the
universe. We shouldn’t take that to justify understanding wu 物 as “super galaxy-
cluster.” The principle of charity, so understood, biases interpretation toward
agreement with us—“to understand is to agree.” It should be theoretically possible
both to understand and disagree with other linguistic communities.
Quine’s proposal was not truth but “stimulus meaning.” The truth that a rabbit
was there did not explain the belief. That the speakers were ordinary humans with
eyes that worked like those of the anthropologist-linguist. That they could see and,
like us, would have their attention drawn to a rabbit’s scurrying around nearby.
Quine had noticed that the counterpart to “stimulus conditions” for theoretical beliefs
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like those of modern science, required access via shared theories, concepts,
practices, and methods of explaining and justifying things. The truth by itself
explains nothing without a mode of causal access. This is where causation enters
semantic theory and the insight applies to religious, ethical, and metaphysical beliefs
as it does to theoretical science. Missionary translators who sought the Chinese word
for “God” tended to justify their practice by appeal to “natural religion.” The rational
mind naturally inclines to creationist monotheism. Not the truth of God’s existence,
but the hypothesis that rational beings had a natural mode of access to that truth
justified treating 天 as ‘God.’ The mode of causal access here is reasoning.
Reasoning causes beliefs A and B to generate C.
Notoriously, furthermore, human philosophical reasoning can start from what
seem like self-evident principles that turn out to be wrong. Some errors (fallacies) of
inference are common. These can explain what I called “understandable error” and
taken together with my analysis of the Mohist discussion of niu ma 牛馬 (ox-horse), I
proposed such a rational-causal explanation of bai ma fei ma 白馬非馬 that concluded
it was in error. Making it false would have counted against my translation manual
had I relied on the metaphysical principle of charity.
This way of slicing the Quinian knot for bai ma 白馬 was then being formulated as
Grandy’s “Principle of Humanity.” It relies on psychological similarity to us but not
agreement in beliefs. The patterns of relationship among beliefs, desires, motivations
are recognizably human. We comparatively prefer the translation manual for which
we can provide the more naturalistically plausible explanation given the cognitive
situation. We can plausibly attribute a set of beliefs to a community when we can
imagine ourselves drawing the inferences they draw—given their presuppositions,
language, access to information, traditions etc. It is the causation we recognize in
ourselves when we come to believe something based on new evidence, deeper
explanation, longer reflection, theorizing—any causally natural human process of
modifying and acquiring beliefs.
This is the conception of “explain” that is relevant to my project. The “causes” of
beliefs are typically other beliefs, and we are humans reasoning about things. Beliefs
can be caused by being taught by opinion leaders, transmitted via trade, revealed in
dreams, etc. Where we find philosophy, we should appreciate that beliefs can also be
produced (caused) by inference from other beliefs—including abduction, philosoph-
ical reflection, and reduction. Philosophical theorizing is caused in that sense.
“Horse-stuff” works because I can use it, together with a causally plausible
background theory of language, to explain both the Mohists’ true claims about bai
ma 白馬 and GONGSUN Long’s false ones.
I realized, therefore, that I could answer Quine if I did more than what Dr. Yang
acknowledges, at the end, my theory does—provide a plausible explanation of the
white horse dialogue. Like truth, unfortunately, there are many ways to explain. The
naturalistic causal principle of humanity does not leave me free to propose just any
combination of background beliefs and assumptions. The principle of humanity
avoids the indeterminacy because it requires that set of background beliefs
postulated be more naturalistically plausible than the rival generated to support an
alternative translation manual. So the measure of relative causal probability yields a
definitive preference between any two rival hypotheses. I strive to show that access
to those assumptions themselves arises from humanly plausible lines of reasoning for
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that linguistic community given their epistemic circumstances. The explanatory
hypotheses used in selecting from the rival packages of beliefs, should both explain
and be explained. However, the explanation uses causal probability, not necessity,
and Plato’s theory of forms, as Professor Yang notices, can be explained by the
combination of a towering intellect, an intellectual puzzle, a set of conceptual and
philosophical tools, and so on. No one would claim the grammar of Greek was a
necessary and sufficient condition of Platonism, nor do I claim the counterpart for
the Mohist theory of ming 名 (names).
For the record, as with Christoff’s arguments, I doubt the attack on Whorfianism
is sound, but that matter belongs to empirical linguistics and the neuro-psychology
of language. It is irrelevant to my argument. Like my friend Christoff, Professor
Yang may insist that contrary to my own recollection and protestations, I was indeed
motivated as they insist by their Mass-Whorf argument. I cannot force them to
accept my own recollections about my argument, but I hereby invoke first person
authority.
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